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• The negativity bias describes the preferential processing of negative stimuli relative to positive or neutral stimuli.
• We propose a superordinate expectancy bias for preferentially processing expectancy-violating stimuli.
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Available online xxxxHumansmaintain a negativity bias, whereby they perceive threatening stimuli to bemore salient than rewarding
or neutral stimuli. Across 6 within-subject experimental comparisons, we tested the hypothesis that humans
maintain an even stronger expectancy bias, preferentially processing stimuli that violate mental representations
of expected associations. To assess this bias, wemeasured variations in pupillary dilation as ameans of determin-
ing attentional arousal in response to neutral, negative and expectancy-violating versions of the same social
stimuli: human faces. We conducted three baseline manipulation checks that directly compared neutral faces
with threatening (angry) and expectancy-violating (upside-down and Thatcherized) faces, and three bias
comparisons that directly compared threatening and expectancy-violating faces with one another. Across
these experiments, we found evidence for a dominant expectancy bias in pupillary arousal for social stimuli,
whereby expectancy-violating faces produced pupillary dilation earlier than neutral and threatening faces,
with Thatcherized faces producing the greatest magnitude of dilation.
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“Bad is stronger than good” (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, &
Vohs, 2001), insofar as negative stimuli are processed preferentially rel-
ative to positive or neutral stimuli (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). This nega-
tivity bias is easy to understand from an adaptive perspective: overlook
a potential reward, and new opportunities may arise; overlook a poten-
tial threat, and it may harken the end of opportunity. Nevertheless,
there is a mode of stimuli that may trump the heightened salience of
negativity: expectancy-violating stimuli, which are inconsistent with
the expected associations that model our experiences.f University, Tower Building, 70In order to act effectively on our environment, we must understand
our environment, which requires an adaptivementalmodel that assigns
a construal of reward or threat (Peterson, 1999). Expectancy-violating
stimuli defy this construal, and thereby thwart the assignment of an un-
ambiguous motivational impetus. We are initially conﬂicted as to
whether we should approach or avoid the source of the unexpected,
and the aversive sense of anxious uncertainty (or dissonance;
Festinger, 1957, or disequilibrium; Piaget, 1937) that often arises is a
warning to address the motivational conﬂict quickly, by means of
rapid attention and action (Gray & McNaughton, 2003; Harmon-Jones,
Amodio, & Harmon-Jones, 2009). While acting prior to an unambiguous
assessment of threat may come at potential cost, failing to act at all may
come at an even greater cost.
Following from this account, we argue that expectancy-violation
constitutes the most initially salient class of motivational stimuli,
70 T. Proulx et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 70 (2017) 69–79producing arousal indicative of increased attentional resources earlier
than other salient experiences. To test this hypothesis, we measured
variations in pupillary dilation (Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008;
Sleegers, Proulx, & van Beest, 2015) as a means of assessing arousal in-
dicative of preferential attention to differentially salient social stimuli:
human faces.We conducted three baselinemanipulation checks that di-
rectly compared neutral faces with threatening (angry) and
expectancy-violating (upside-down and “Thatcherized”; Thompson,
1980) faces, and three bias comparisons that directly compared angry,
upside-down and Thatcherized faceswith one another. Across these ex-
periments, we expected evidence for a dominant expectancy bias,
whereby expectancy-violating faces would evoke earlier attentional
arousal (PD) than neutral and threatening faces.
2. Attentional salience of negativity
Human consciousness is bombarded by internally and externally
generated stimuli—an array of information that would become over-
whelming if not for attentional ﬁlters that render some stimuli inher-
ently salient. This salience is determined by neuro-attentional
mechanisms involving large-scale networks in the parietal and frontal
cortices that modulate sensory processing to selectively enhance the
visual representation of relevant stimuli and suppress irrelevant infor-
mation (Kastner &Ungerleider, 2001). Much of the research on the allo-
cation of attentional resources has focused on those qualities of stimuli
that render them motivationally salient, more generally. To date, the
predominant focus has been on the negativity bias, often understood
as a propensity to attend (e.g., Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999;
Carretie, Martin-Loeches, Hinojosa, & Mercado, 2001) and respond
(Baumeister et al., 2001) more rapidly to threatening stimuli
(i.e., punishments, e.g., Rozin & Royzman, 2001 or obstacles to reward,
e.g., Blascovich, 2000) than to rewarding or neutral stimuli.
While the preponderance of this research demonstrates that nega-
tively valenced stimuli are more salient than positive or neutral infor-
mation, some work suggests that positive stimuli may be equally
salient if it is of equivalent magnitude (e.g., Foti, Hajcak, & Dien, 2009;
Schupp, Junghofer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003; Schupp, Junghofer, Weike,
& Hamm, 2004; see Weinberg & Hajcak, 2010). Taken together, these
ﬁndings suggest that it is cues to the overall motivational signiﬁcance
of stimuli that primarily determines the attentional salience of a
given stimulus (in this case, cues to threat or reward), though it is
likely that negatively valenced stimuli tend to be more salient overall
(e.g., see Baumeister et al., 2001). However, a category ofmotivationally
salient stimuli that has yet to be directly compared to negativity is
expectancy-violation.
3. Attentional salience of expectancy violation
Humans take in sensory stimuli, store these experiences in memory
and construct mental models that predict and interpret subsequent ex-
periences. These mental models are a fundamental prerequisite for
functioning in our changing environment, allowing us to understand
experiences that range from naive physics to social interactions to our
own internal states. Depending on the kind of experience organized
by a given model, these representations have been called perceptual
paradigms (Bruner, 1990), assumptive worlds (Janoff-Bulman, 1992)
or schemata (Piaget, 2000), and to the extent that thementalmodel im-
plies an a priori guide for action: meaning frameworks (Peterson, 1999;
Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). Inherent in any of these representations is a
motivational signiﬁcance that categorizes the stimuli as a potential re-
ward or threat, which in turn cues the emotional valence of subsequent
arousal (Hirsh, Mar, & Peterson, 2012).
Underlying all of these modes of representation is a common con-
struct: expectation.We expect our experiences to conform to our repre-
sentations, whether this involves an expectation that crows are black
(Piaget, 1937), the world is just (Lerner, 1980) or that threateningstimuli will cause harm. Thesemodels aremental representations of ex-
pected associations, and experiences that are inconsistent with these
representations evoke an initial attentional salience and a proximalmo-
tivation to react to the discrepancy (Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones,
2012; see also Peterson, 1999).
Most often, stimuli violate our expectations insofar as they are differ-
ent from what we have experienced in the past. These stimuli could be
novel relative to a lifetime of prior experiences (i.e., conceptual novelty
[Kagan, 2009], e.g., a white crow [Piaget, 1937], or a red Ace of Spades
[Bruner & Postman, 1949]) or novel relative to a recently learned, arbi-
trary pattern (i.e., stimuli novelty [Kagan, 2009] e.g., a ‘Y’ preceded by a
series of ‘X’s in an oddball paradigm [Dunchan-Johnson & Donchin,
1977]). In the face of these experiences, the absence of an initially appli-
cable mental model makes us unsure as to whether the stimuli repre-
sent a reward we should approach, or a threat we should avoid
(Peterson, 1999)—a state of motivational ambivalence that must be
quickly resolved if a state of potentially paralyzing goal conﬂict is to
be avoided (Gray & McNaughton, 2003).
This conﬂict may be particularly acute for stimuli that is not merely
different fromwhat we have experienced in the past, but which also ac-
tivates two incongruous representations simultaneously, and as such,
constitute neither (e.g., uncanniness following experiences that are
both familiar and unfamiliar [Freud, 1990], or a duck/rabbit gestalt illu-
sion [Köhler, 1929]). In an experimental setting, inherently incongruous
experiencesmay be operationalized as conceptually inconsistent stimu-
li, such as the word “green” coloured blue (Stroop, 1992). Alternatively,
itmay involve stimuli that arouse attitudinal ambivalence, insofar as the
experience simultaneously activates threatening and rewarding associ-
ations (Miller, 1944), or ambiguous evaluative feedback that forces us to
maintain multiple outcomes (e.g., encountering threatening and re-
warding associations [Holroyd, Hajcak, & Larsen, 2006]).
4. Neuroaffective outcomes
More recently, a theoretical perspective has emerged which frames
these and other experiences in terms of prediction error (Montague,
Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996), where many of the cognitive conﬂict phe-
nomena reported in cognitive, social, developmental and clinical psy-
chology are hypothesized to be instantiations of expectancy violation
(Jonas et al., 2014; Proulx et al., 2012). Speciﬁcally, phenomena associ-
ated with the aversive arousal state that follows from the violation of
expected associations described in these literatures, whether it is the
disequilibrium that follows from the violation of a developmental sche-
ma (Piaget, 2000), the dissonance that follows from the violation of a
committed belief (Harmon-Jones et al., 2009), the uncertainty that fol-
lows from the violation of a mental representation (Van den Bos,
2001) or the anxiety we experience when our assumptive worlds fail
to account for our experiences (Janoff-Bulman, 1992)—a state that we
summarize as disanxiousuncertlibrium (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). From
this perspective, all of these terms designate the same neuroaffective
syndrome of brain activation and sympathetic nervous system arousal
that follows from any violation of expectation, whether it represents a
“high”- or “low”-level prediction error.
This syndrome of arousal is initiated by the orienting response
(Courchesne, Hillyard, & Galambos, 1975; Kok, 1997; see Peterson,
1999), reﬂected in an ERP amplitude that is understood as the
organism's initial reaction to changes in its environment (Sokolov,
2002). This response cues to any expectancy violation, whether the
source is mere novelty (e.g., oddball paradigm, Johnson, 1988) or an in-
congruous stimulus (e.g., Stroop task, Liotti,Woldorff, Perez, &Mayberg,
2000). Following the orienting response, tonic inhibition of the reticular
formation by hippocampal CA3 neurons is released and a lower brain
circuit including the amygdala is disinhibited, which activates circuitry
in the right hemisphere (Tucker & Frederick, 1989) and subsequently
inhibits the prefrontal left cortical hemisphere that is associated with
approach motivation (see Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2011;
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with activation of the behavioral inhibition system, more generally,
and the release of cortical noradrenaline that underlies heightened at-
tentional vigilance and scanning of the environment. Subsequently,
there is a psychological threat response—a chain reaction of sympathet-
ic nervous system arousal that involves cortisol and changes in cardiac
activity (Blascovich, 2000; Fowles, 1980).
To the extent that a given stimulus violates activated expected asso-
ciations, the arousal that is initiated by the orienting response plays a
role in how the valence of subsequent stimuli is interpreted. Speciﬁcally,
the emotional valence of threatening or rewarding stimuli is experi-
enced asmore intense if it is associatedwith expectancy-violating expe-
riences. For example, in a meta-analysis of laboratory-based studies,
Dickerson andKemeny (2004) found that threats grounded inuncertain
outcomes increase cortisol levels more dramatically than any other
stressor. Similarly, Grupe andNitschke (2011) in a series of skin conduc-
tance andmood experiments, discovered that uncertainty ampliﬁed the
impact of negative events. In terms of positive experiences, Wilson and
colleagues (Wilson, Centerbar, Kermer, & Gilbert, 2005) found that un-
certainty about a positive event prolonged the pleasure that it caused.
Additionally, animals have been found to eat more if their food was en-
countered in an unexpected location than if it was found in an expected
location (Roitman, van Dijk, Thiele, & Bernstein, 2001).
5. Negativity vs. expectancy violation
People attend and react more strongly to unexpected stimuli com-
pared to familiar/expected information. However, few studies have di-
rectly compared the effect of expectancy violation to other types of
attentionally salient information. One exception is ERP work that has
demonstrated greater ERN amplitudes in response to ambiguous com-
pared to negative feedback. Holroyd et al. (2006) established, for exam-
ple, that ambiguous feedback elicited heightened error-related
negativity to an equivalent magnitude as negative feedback. Hirsh and
Inzlicht (2008) further investigated individual differences in response
to ambiguous vs. negative feedback (also see Gu, Ge, & Huang, 2010)
and found that some individuals react more strongly to ambiguous
feedback than failure feedback. However, no study has directly com-
pared negatively valenced and expectancy-violating versions of the
same stimuli with the expectation of a superordinate expectancy bias:
a preferential processing of expectancy-violating stimuli relative to
negative stimuli. Speciﬁcally, no study has compared these classes of sa-
lience in a manner that can distinguish negative and expectancy-
violating versions of the same stimuli, both in terms of processing
amplitude, the time course of arousal and the allocation of attentional
resources. To assess these relevant dimensions, we will measure pupil-
lary dilation, a neuroaffective marker that varies in size with the
magnitude of attentional salience, and has been shown to index the
differential time course of attentional arousal for both negative
(e.g., Bradley et al., 2008) and expectancy-violating (Sleegers et al.,
2015) stimuli.
6. Pupillary dilation as ameasure of attentional salience and arousal
Pupillary reactivity (i.e., changes in pupil size) is a marker of prefer-
ential processing, and can serve as an index of both neurocognitive
arousal in reaction to the attentional saliency of a stimulus, and an
index of subsequent sympathetic nervous system arousal correspond-
ing to the valence of the stimuli. Initially, pupillary dilation (PD)
increases when salient stimuli activate the locus coeruleus-
norepinephrine system (LC-NE), a neurocognitive substrate of the Be-
havioral Inhibition System (Amodio, Master, Yee, & Taylor, 2008;
Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005). LC-NE activation plays a fundamental
role in engagement or withdrawal from a task bymeans of norepineph-
rine (NE) that is released by the locus coeruleus (LC) through projec-
tions in the forebrain (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005). In turn, this NEdirectly modulates dilation of the pupil, such that PD correlates with
LC activity in humans (Gilzenrat et al., 2003) and other primates
(Raikowski, Kubiak, & Aston-Jones, 1993), and is consistent with LC
phasic response to a variety of working memory concentration tasks,
such as judgments of similarity (Beatty, 1982), oddness/evenness of
recalled numbers (Smallwood et al., 2011) or relative probabilities
(Jepma & Nieuwenhuis, 2011).
Of central relevance to our main hypothesis, concentration task er-
rors evoke especially heightened PD (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2011),
whereby experiences associated with surprise (i.e., prediction error)
more generally increase PD due to the rapid release of NE (Preuschoff,
Hart, & Einhauser, 2011). Subsequently, pupillary variability co-varies
with measures of skin conductance and cardiac activity, suggesting
that it also represents an additional component of downstream sympa-
thetic nervous system arousal (Bradley et al., 2008). As such, PD modu-
lations in task engagement reﬂect and differentiate arousal produced by
the salient aspects of the relevant stimuli, whether they represent ex-
pectancy violation or emotional valance.
The pupillary manifestation of arousal associated with expectation
and emotional valence has previously been explored in separate studies
that correspond to these distinct time intervals. Expectancy violation PD
has been primarily observed initially following the pupillary light reﬂex
calibration to a presented stimulus, represented as an initial spike in PD,
with the peak appearing between 500 ms–1500 ms following stimulus
onset. This initial spike in PD is consistently evoked by a variety of
expectancy-violating task stimuli, such as incongruent Stroop task trials
(e.g., Laeng, Ørbo, Holmlund, & Miozzo, 2011; Rondeel, Van
Steenbergen, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2015), inconsistent Simon
task trials (Van Steenbergen & Band, 2013) and incongruent playing
card features—even when people have no conscious awareness of the
incongruity (Sleegers et al., 2015). In contrast, emotional valence PD
has been primarily observed at longer intervals following stimulus
onset, represented as a gradually heightened, then sustained dilation
following 1500 ms. This different and temporally latent pattern of PD
is consistently evoked by a variety of negatively and positively valenced
stimuli, for example, with unpleasant and pleasant photos (Bradley
et al., 2008; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) and sounds (Partala &
Surakka, 2003).
Taken together, these phases of PD may correspond to two distinct
time courses of preferential processing, whereby initial PD (500 ms–
1500 ms) is evoked by the comparison of stimuli to relevant expected
associations, and subsequent PD (1500 ms+) is a response to the
assessment of emotional valence. Stimuli that violate expectations ap-
pear to cause the LC to release NE, initiating an initial PD spike that in-
dexes heightened attentional arousal. The valence of stimuli may be
determined subsequently, potentially resulting in heightened and
sustained pupillary arousal indicative of sympathetic nervous system
arousal whether the stimulus is negative (potential threat) or positive
(potential reward). To date, no study has directly assessed such prefer-
ential processing by comparing the time course of PD in response to
negatively-valenced and expectancy-violating versions of the same so-
cial stimuli.
7. Threatening and expectancy-violating faces
The stimuli we chose for this comparison are photos of human faces,
insofar as they can discretely project salient threat (angry expressions),
and can be altered in ways to discretely evoke salient expectancy viola-
tions (upside-down orientation and Thatcherized features, see Fig. 1).
Angry faces have been commonly used to assess a general negativity
bias (Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Öhman, et al., 2001). Speciﬁcally, angry
faces have been used as a means of evoking threat (Schutter, de Haan,
& vanHonk, 2004; Van der Schalk et al., 2011) without also constituting
a violation of expectation (e.g., see Whalen & Taylor, 2014), and to the
same extent as other especially salient threats (e.g., snakes; Öhman,
2009). While angry faces may be less common in everyday experience,
Fig. 1. An example of A) neutral, B) angry, C) upside-down and D) Thatcherized faces.
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merable angry faces prior to entering the lab, where they may be espe-
cially expected in the initial context of an emotion recognition task (see
Methods). As such, we expected angry faces to evoke the same pattern
of PD produced by other negatively-valenced stimuli (gradually height-
ened, then sustained increase following1500ms), while showingno ev-
idence of the pattern of PD produced by expectancy-violating stimuli
(initial spike between 500 and 1500 ms).
To robustly examine the relative effect of expectancy-violating faces,
we operationalized expectancy violation in a face-valid manner with
two versions of expectancy-violating faces. The ﬁrst of these faces pre-
sented a neutral expression on a face that was rotated 180°. These
upside-down faces are novel, insofar as they represent an orientation
seldom encountered in natural experience (Kagan, 2009), which may
be particularly unexpected in the context of an emotion recognition
task. Moreover, the emotion conveyed by the face conveys no threat,
with nothing inherently negative about the inverted image. As such,
we expected upside-down faces to evoke the same pattern of PD pro-
duced by other expectancy-violating stimuli (initial spike between
500 and 1500ms), while showing no evidence of the pattern of PD pro-
duced by negative stimuli (gradually heightened, then sustained in-
crease following 1500 ms).
The second of these expectancy-violating faces also presented a neu-
tral expression on a face that was rotated 180°. However, in addition to
the novel upside-down orientation, these faces contained an inherent in-
congruity, insofar as the eyes and mouth were oriented right-side-up.
This mis-orientation represents a classic “Thatcher illusion” (Thompson,
1980), whereby individuals consciously reorient the facial features so
that they appear congruent with the inverted face, even as they uncon-
sciously register the incongruity (e.g., Carbon, Schweinberger,
Kaufmann, & Leder, 2005). As with the merely upside-down faces, the
Thatcherized faces should evoke the same pattern of PD produced by
other expectancy-violating stimuli (initial spike between 500 and
1500 ms)—a PD pattern also observed for other expectancy–violating
stimuli whose novel features are not consciously detected (e.g.,
reverse-coloured playing cards, Sleegers et al., 2015). As with the
upside-down faces, the absence of inherently negative elements should
preclude the pattern of PD produced by negative stimuli (gradually
heightened, then sustained increase following 1500 ms). However,
given the presence of both novel and inherently incongruent features,
we expected that Thatcherized faces would be experienced as
expectancy–violating to a greater extent, evoking even larger makers of
attentional arousal relative to merely upside-down faces.
8. Study overview
Over 6 experimental comparisons, we tested for the presence of a
dominant expectancy bias in the processing of differentially salientstimuli. Unlike other measures of attentional salience (e.g., late positive
potential; Codispoti, Ferrari, & Bradley, 2007), we were unsure whether
PD would differentiate multiple variations of a single class of stimuli
(i.e., faces) in a single within-subjects setting. To ensure that we could
clearly assess and interpret the comparisons relevant to our hypotheses,
we conducted six separate within-subject experiments, allowing us the
clearest means of directly contrasting pupillary responses to neutral,
negative and expectancy-violating faces in direct comparison with one
another, without the possibility of interfering assimilation/contrast ef-
fects (Charness, Gneezy, & Kuhn, 2012; Greenwald, 1976).
The ﬁrst 3 of these experiments were baseline manipulation checks
that would validate our stimuli as representations of threat and
expectancy-violation, insofar as they should evoke the respective and
differential patterns of arousal previously reported as associated with
these stimuli. These experiments presented each of the attentionally sa-
lient faces (angry, upside-down and Thatcherized) and baseline neutral
faces in direct paired comparisons. If our stimuli were operationally
valid, angry, upside-down and Thatcherized faceswould all evoke an at-
tentional bias relative neutral faces. In the case of angry faces, this bias
would manifest as gradually heightened, then sustained PD during the
emotional valence time period (1500 + ms) (H1a). In the case of
upside-down and Thatcherized faces, this bias wouldmanifest as an ini-
tial spike primarily during the time period that PD responds to expec-
tancy violation (500 ms–1500 ms) (H1b).
The next 3 experiments were bias comparisons that directly tested
our expectancy bias hypothesis. These experiments presented each of
the attentionally salient faces (angry, upside-down and Thatcherized)
with one another in direct paired comparisons. If expectancy-violating
faces evoke an attentional bias relative to threatening faces, then both
of the expectancy-violating faces (upside-down and Thatcherized)
would be processed preferentially relative to angry faces (H2a). This
wouldmanifest as heightened PDduring the initial expectancy violation
time period (500 ms–1500 ms) relative to the angry faces. If the
Thatcherized faces, being both novel (upside-down) and inherently in-
congruent (right-side-up features) would be the most expectancy-
violating, then they would evoke greater attentional bias even relative
to the up-side-down faces (H2b), manifesting as a comparatively
heightened PD during the initial expectancy violation time period
(500 ms–1500 ms).
9. Method
9.1. Participants
237 total participants (76 males, 161 females) were recruited using
the Tilburg University signup system. They participated either for
course credit or €5. Their average age was 20.78 (min: 18, max: 32)
and consisted largely of Tilburg University students. Participants were
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sample size of 25 participants per experiment was determined by a
power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner,
2007), assuming a medium to large effect size as reported in prior re-
search assessing PD in response to cognitive conﬂict in a within-
subjects, repeated measures, paired comparisons design (e.g., Van
Steenbergen & Band, 2013). Random assignment continued to the con-
clusion of the academic term, resulting in unequal Ns across conditions.
Collection was not continued after data analysis.
9.2. Materials
All materials and measures are reported and are available upon re-
quest. All face images were taken from the Radboud Faces Database
(Langner et al., 2010). The Radboud Faces Database (RaFD) is a set of
pictures of 67 models (including Caucasian males and females,
Caucasian children, both boys and girls, and Moroccan Dutch males)
displaying 8 emotional expressions. Our neutral, up-side-down and
Thatcherized faces were selected from Caucasian adult male and female
database faces with neutral expressions. Neutral faces were correctly
oriented. Upside-down faces were rendered expectancy-violating by
presenting them rotated 180°. Thatcherized faces were rendered more
expectancy-violating by altering them with image editing software
(Pixelmator; Pixelmator Team, 2016), such that they incongruously
represent a face that is upside-down, with eyes and mouth which are
right-side-up. For the threatening faces, we selected Caucasian adult
males and females with angry emotional expressions.
9.2.1. Faces task
Each faces task consisted of two types of faces being presented to the
participant, with probe trials interspersed throughout the task at which
point the participant had to indicate the negative or positive valence of
the previous facial expression. Across all experiments, negative vs. pos-
itive was chosen as a fast, intuitive valence judgment relative to nega-
tive vs. neutral, given that neutrally valenced faces are generally
perceived as negative (e.g., Lee et al., 2008). In addition to ensuring
that participants maintained attention to the task, the probe trials
served as a manipulation check to ensure that threatening faces were
experienced as negative relative to the neutral, upside-down and
Thatcherized faces, and to ensure that neutral, upside-down and
Thatcherized faces were not experienced as negative relative to one
another.
In addition to establishing distinct pupillary responses for threaten-
ing and expectancy–violating faces in the baseline condition, these
judgments would provide further evidence that any evidence for an ex-
pectancy bias could not be taken as additional evidence for an
emotionally-valenced negativity bias. Within each condition we count-
ed the total number of probe trials for each kind of face and calculated
what percentage of those trials each type of face was rated as negative.
This allowed us to analyze each face-type pairing in terms of how often
it was seen as more negative than positive, by means of paired t-tests.
Each face was 550 × 827 pixels in size and presented at the center of
the screen for a duration of 5000ms. Probe trials consisted of a question
mark and required a response from the participant—a “1” to indicate
that the previous face had a negative valence and a “2” for a positive va-
lence. Before each presentation, a ﬁxation cross was visible at the center
of the screen. Participants had to remain focused at the ﬁxation cross for
a duration of 1000 ms for a stimulus to appear. The task consisted of 10
practice trials and two blocks of experimental trials. Each block
consisted of 100 trials: 39 of each type of face, and 22 probe trials.
9.2.2. Pupillary dilation recording and processing
Pupil dilation was measured using the Tobii T60 eye tracker (Tobii
Technology, Inc., Sweden) and E-Prime Professional 2.0 software
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). The Tobii T60 eye tracker
is integrated into a 17-inch TFT monitor and records a variety of pupilcharacteristics, including pupil size, through screen based eye tracking
at a rate of 60Hz for each eye separately. Eachmeasurement has a valid-
ity indication that ranges from 0 (the system is certain that all data be-
longs to the particular eye) to 4 (gaze data is missing or incorrect). Only
recordings with a validity score of 0 were used. Pupil size from each eye
were averaged together to create a single pupil size score and ﬁltered
with a modiﬁed repeated median ﬁlter (outer width: 25, inner width
15) using the robﬁlter package (Fried, Schettlinger, & Borowski, 2014)
in R (R Core Team, 2016). Artifacts such as blinks were corrected using
linear interpolation from the ‘zoo’ package in R (Zeileis, Grothendieck,
Ryan, Andrews, & Zeileis, 2015). Baseline differences in pupil size
were controlled for by subtracting the average pupil size during a
500 ms pre-trial period from the subsequent pupil measurements.
10. Results
To investigate the impact of the different types of faces on pupil di-
ameter, we conducted six separate experimental comparisons, each
one assessed with a 2 (Face type: [Baseline Manipulation Check] angry
vs. neutral, upside-down vs. neutral, Thatcherized vs. neutral, [Bias
Comparisons] upside-down vs. angry, Thatcherized vs. upside-down,
Thatcherized vs. angry) × 19 (Time: 500 to 5000 s, in 250 ms bins)
repeated-measures GLM analyses. The ﬁrst 500 ms after stimulus
onset was regarded as the light reﬂex period and was therefore not in-
cluded in the analysis (Prehn et al., 2008). For each comparison,we test-
ed the main effects for face type, time, and the interaction of face type
and time on pupil diameter. We also separately tested the mean differ-
ences of pupil diameter at the time periods primarily associated with
cognitive conﬂict (500 ms–1500 ms) and sympathetic nervous system
arousal (1500 + ms). Sphericity assumptions were checked with the
Mauchly's test of sphericity. In case of a violation of this assumption,
we report Huynh-Feldt corrected statistics.
11. Baseline manipulation checks: angry, upside-down and
Thatcherized vs. neutral
11.1. Angry vs. neutral faces
11.1.1. Negativity manipulation check
Angry faces were rated as more negative than neutral faces, t(40) =
16.38, p b 0.001, dz=2.56. Angry faceswere rated as negative 96.46% of
the time, while neutral faces were rated as negative only 28.53% of the
time.
11.1.2. Pupillary dilation
The comparison between angry and neutral faces revealed a signiﬁ-
cant main effect of face type, F(1, 40) = 33.24, p b 0.001, η2p=0.454, a
main effect of time, F(1.85, 123.72) = 26.40, p b 0.001, η2p = 0.398, as
well as a signiﬁcant interaction of face type and time, F(3.18,
127.38) = 11.88, p b 0.001, η2p = 0.229; see Fig. 2. During both the
500–1500 ms period and the 1500 +ms period there is a greater aver-
age pupil size for angry faces compared to neutral faces. In support of
H1a, this difference is larger after 1500 + ms (angry faces:M = 0.11,
SD = 0.07; neutral faces: M = 0.07, SD = 0.08), t(40) = 5.82,
p b 0.001, dz = 0.91), compared to the initial period (angry faces:
M = 0.06, SD = 0.06; neutral faces: M = 0.04, SD = 0.06, t(40) =
3.96, p b 0.001, dz= 0.62).
11.2. Upside-down vs. neutral faces
11.2.1. Negativity manipulation check
No difference was found in valence between upside-down and neu-
tral faces, t(40) = 1.91, p= 0.064, dz= 0.30. Upside-down faces were
rated as negative 52.98%of the time andneutral faceswere rated as neg-
ative 57.46% of the time.
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Fig. 2. Baseline manipulation checks of pupillary dilation in response to A) angry vs. neutral faces B) upside-down vs. neutral faces C) Thatcherized vs. neutral faces.
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Comparing upside-down faces to neutral faces, we found a signiﬁ-
cant main effect of face type, F(1, 40) = 20.13, p b 0.001, η2p = 0.335,
a main effect of time, F(2.57, 102.61) = 10.69, p b 0.001, η2p = 0.211,
as well as a signiﬁcant interaction of face type and time, F(3.52,
140.98) = 6.95, p b 0.001, η2p = 0.148; see Fig. 2. During both the
500–1500ms period and the 1500+ms period there is greater average
pupil size for upside-down faces compared to neutral faces. In support
of H1b, this difference is larger in the initial 500 ms–1500 ms period
(upside-down faces: M = 0.10, SD = 0.05, neutral faces: M = 0.06,
SD = 0.05, t(40) = 6.82, p b 0.001, dz = 1.06) compared to the
1500 + ms period (upside-down faces: M = 0.12, SD = 0.07, neutral
faces:M= 0.09, SD= 0.07, t(40) = 3.55, p= 0.001, dz= 0.55).
11.3. Thatcherized vs. neutral faces
11.3.1. Negativity manipulation check
No difference in valence was found between Thatcherized faces and
neutral faces, t(40) = 1.42, p = 0.162, dz = 0.22. Thatcherized faces
were rated as negative 66.88% of the time and neutral faces were
rated as negative 62.70% of the time.
11.3.2. Pupillary dilation
Comparing Thatcherized faces to neutral faces, we found a marginal
signiﬁcant main effect of the type of face, F(1, 40) = 3.53, p = 0.067,
η2p = 0.081, a main effect of time, F(2.06, 82.42) = 19.12, p b 0.001,
η2p = 0.323, as well as a marginally signiﬁcant interaction of face type
and time, F(2.46, 98.47)= 2.65, p=0.064, η2p=0.062; see Fig. 2. Dur-
ing the 500–1500ms period we observe a greater average pupil size for
Thatcherized faces compared to neutral faces; this is not the case during
the 1500 +ms period. In support of H1b, this difference during the ini-
tial 500–1500 ms is signiﬁcant (Thatcherized faces: M = 0.09, SD =
0.05, neutral faces: M = 0.07, SD = 0.05; t(41) = 3.50, p = 0.001,
dz= 0.54). There was no signiﬁcant difference during the 1500 + ms
period, t(41) = 1.68, p= 0.10, dz= 0.26.
12. Bias comparisons: angry vs. upside-down vs. Thatcherized
12.1. Upside-down vs. angry faces
12.1.1. Negativity manipulation check
Angry faces were rated as more negative than upside-down faces,
t(33)= 13.38, p=0.003, dz=2.09. Angry faces were rated as negative
97.83% of the time, while upside-down faces were rated as negative
35.17% of the time.
12.1.2. Pupillary dilation
Comparing upside-down faces and angry faces revealed nomain ef-
fect of face type, F(1, 33)= 0.18, p=0.673, η2p=0.005, but did show a
main effect of time, F(2.90, 95.53)=10.64, p b 0.001, η2p=0.244, and a
signiﬁcant interaction of face type an time, F(3.41, 112.48) = 13.44,
p b 0.001, η2p = 0.289, see Fig. 3. During the 500–1500 ms period we
observe a greater average pupil size for upside-down faces compared
to angry faces; this is not the case during the 1500+ms period. In sup-
port of H2a, this difference during the initial 500–1500ms is signiﬁcant
(upside-down faces:M=0.10, SD=0.08, angry faces:M=0.08, SD=
0.08; t(33)=4.50, p b 0.001, dz=0.77). Therewas no signiﬁcant differ-
ence during the 1500+msperiod, t(33)=0.408, p=0.686, dz=0.07.
12.2. Thatcherized vs. angry faces
12.2.1. Negativity manipulation check
Angry faces were also rated as more negative than Thatcherized
faces, t(42)=16.80, p b 0.001, dz=2.56. Angry faceswere rated as neg-
ative 96.72% of the time, while Thatcherized faces were rated as nega-
tive only 31.21% of the time.12.2.2. Pupillary dilation
The comparison between Thatcherized and angry faces revealed a
signiﬁcant main effect of face type, F(1, 42) = 5.82, p = 0.02, η2p =
0.122, a main effect of time, F(2.70, 113.31) = 41.03, p b 0.001, η2p =
0.494, as well as a signiﬁcant interaction of face type and time, F(2.95,
123.96) = 30.32, p b 0.001, η2p = 0.419; see Fig. 3. During the 500–
1500msperiodwe observe a greater average pupil size for Thatcherized
faces compared to angry faces; during the1500+msperiodwe observe
a greater average pupil size for angry faces compared to Thatcherized
faces. In support of H2a, this difference during the initial 500–1500 ms
is signiﬁcant (Thatcherized faces: M = 0.07, SD = 0.06, angry faces:
M=0.05, SD=0.06 t(42)=2.87, p=0.006, dz=0.44). The difference
during the 1500 + ms period is also signiﬁcant (Thatcherized faces:
M= 0.11, SD= 0.09, angry faces:M= 0.14, SD= 0.07; t(42) = 3.27,
p= 0.002, dz= 0.50).
12.3. Thatcherized vs. upside-down faces
12.3.1. Negativity manipulation check
Thatcherized faces were seen as less negative than upside-down
faces, t(35) = 2.05, p = 0.048, dz = 0.34. Thatcherized faces were
rated as negative 48.11% of the time while upside-down faces were
rated as negative 59.17% of the time.
12.3.2. Pupillary dilation
Comparing Thatcherized faces to upside-down faces,we found a sig-
niﬁcantmain effect of face type, F(1, 35)=16.66, p b 0.001, η2p=0.322,
a main effect of time, F(1.83, 64.21) = 17.05, p b 0.001, η2p = 0.328, as
well as a signiﬁcant interaction of face type and time, F(3.42, 119.82) =
3.43, p= 0.015, η2p = 0.089; see Fig. 3. We observe a greater average
pupil size for Thatcherized faces compared to upside-down faces during
the 500–1500 ms period and the 1500 +ms period. In support of H2b,
this difference is signiﬁcant in the initial 500 ms–1500 ms period
(Thatcherized faces: M = 0.11, SD = 0.06, upside-down faces: M =
0.09, SD = 0.05, t(35) = 5.22, p b 0.001, dz = 0.87), and produces a
slighter larger effect size than the PDdifference in the 1500+ms period
(Thatcherized faces: M = 0.15, SD = 0.09, upside-down faces: M =
0.13, SD= 0.09, t(35) = 3.69, p= 0.001, dz= 0.61).
13. Discussion
In three baseline manipulation check and three bias comparisons,
we used relative PD to test our expectancy bias hypothesis. The baseline
comparisons represented our primary manipulation check determining
whether our threatening (angry faces) and expectancy-violating
stimuli (upside-down and Thatcherized faces) were experienced as
attentionally salient relative to neutral versions of the same stimuli
(neutral faces), and whether the negative and expectancy-violating
stimuli produced patterns of pupillary reactivity that corresponded
with other negative (H1a) and expectancy-violating (H1b) stimuli.
These comparisons conﬁrmed the validity of our chosen stimuli, insofar
as angry, upside-down and Thatcherized faces evoked greater pupillary
dilation compared to neutral faces, with angry faces evoking the same
distinctive pattern of PD associated with sympathetic nervous system
arousal following other negative stimuli (heightened PD 1500 ms+),
and upside-down and Thatcherized faces both evoking the same dis-
tinctive pattern of PD associated with conﬂict detection following
other expectancy-violating stimuli (PD spike 500 ms–1500 ms).
The three bias comparisons represented the primary test of our
expectancy bias hypothesis, determining whether our expectancy-
violating stimuli would evoke heightened PD earlier than negatively-
valenced versions of the same stimuli (H2a), and whether our
incongruous expectancy-violating stimuli (Thatcherized faces) would
evoke heightened PD relative to a merely novel version of the same
stimuli (upside-down faces) (H2b). Consistent with our hypotheses,
we found that both upside-down and Thatcherized faces evoke
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Fig. 3. Bias comparisons of pupillary dilation in response to D) upside-down vs. angry faces E) Thatcherized vs. angry face F) Thatcherized vs. upside-down faces.
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the baseline conditions (an initial spike between 500 ms–1500 ms vs.
heightened PD following 1500 ms+). Furthermore, the degree of
expectancy-violation impacted attentional arousal, such that
Thatcherized upside-down faces evoked a heightened initial PD
(500 ms–1500 ms) relative to upside-down faces.
Taken together, these ﬁndings are entirely consistentwith an expec-
tancy bias in arousal and attention, insofar as expectancy-violating
stimuli are preferentially processed (i.e., heightened earlier PD) relative
to neutral and negative versions of the same stimuli, where this effect is
greatest for stimuli that is expectancy-violating to the greatest extent.
None of these ﬁndings are consistent with a dominant negativity bias
in pupillary arousal, insofar as the baselinemanipulation checks validat-
ed and distinguished the patterns of pupillary dilation differentially
evoked by expectancy-violating and negative versions of the same so-
cial stimuli, where these distinct patternsweremanifestmore generally
across all six experiments—a pattern of results that would not be possi-
ble if the expectancy-violating stimuli were experienced in an emotion-
ally negative manner, or vice versa. This validation of the stimuli was
further conﬁrmed by the additional negativity manipulation check,
which established that neither of the expectancy-violating faces were
experienced as more negative than neutral or angry faces.
14. Inﬂuence of Thatcherized faces
Rather than conducting a single within-subjects design, we chose to
thoroughly test our expectancy bias hypothesis with six distinct paired
comparisons out of concern that PD in response to one class of stimuli
may be inﬂuenced by the presence of other classes of the same stimuli.
While it did not alter the pattern of results relevant to our expectancy
bias hypothesis, it appeared that the response to neutral and negative
stimuli may have been heightened in the presence of the most
expectancy-violating stimuli: Thatcherized faces.
14.1. Thatcherized and neutral
In the baseline comparison of Thatcherized and neutral faces,
Thatcherized faces evoked the expected increase in pupillary dilation
relative to neutral faces, however, this difference appeared relatively
smaller than the increase evoked by upside-down faces. Inspection of
the graph reveals that the relatively smaller difference between
Thatcherized and neutral faces may have been due to an overall relative
increase in pupillary dilation for the neutral faces, rather than a relative
decrease in pupillary dilation for the Thatcherized faces. To test this pos-
sibility, we conducted exploratory analyses comparing PD for the neu-
tral faces in the angry and upside-down baseline conditions to PD for
neutral faces in the Thatcherized face condition.
When we compare the overall mean PD of neutral faces when pre-
sented with angry (M = 0.07, SD = 0.07) or Thatcherized (M = 0.1,
SD= 0.07) faces, we ﬁnd a near signiﬁcant difference, F(1, 81) = 3.96,
p= 0.05, η2p = 0.047, whereby neutral (vs. Thatcherized) faces evoke
greater PD than neutral (vs. angry) faces. However, when we compare
the overall mean PD of neutral faces when presented with upside-
down (M = 0.09, SD = 0.06) or Thatcherized (M = 0.1, SD = 0.07)
faces, the difference is not signiﬁcant, F(1, 81) = 0.51, p= 0.48, η2p =
0.01, though the overall mean PD values for Thatcherized (M = 0.1,
SD= 0.06) and upside-down (M= 0.1, SD= 0.06) faces are identical,
and not signiﬁcantly different F(1, 81) = 0.02, p= 0.89, η2p b 0.01.
In sum, both Thatcherized and upside-down faces produce the same
magnitude of PD (M=0.1, SD=0.06) in their respective baseline con-
ditions, and the magnitude of PD for neutral faces in the Thatcherized
condition appears greater than neutral PD in the angry and upside-
down conditions, albeit with near signiﬁcance and non-signiﬁcance, re-
spectively. Future replications can determine whether the relative dif-
ference in PD is indeed greater for upside-down and neutral faces
compared to Thatcherized and neutral faces, and if so, if this relativedifference is due to a general increase in PD for neutral faces in the pres-
ence of Thatcherized faces.
14.1.1. Thatcherized and angry
In the bias comparison of Thatcherized and angry faces, we found a
“crossover” interaction between inconsistent and negative faces over
time, whereby Thatcherized faces evoked relatively heightened PD dur-
ing the initial expectancy-violation period (500 ms–1500 ms), and
angry faces evoked relatively heightened PD during the period associat-
ed with sympathetic nervous system arousal (1500 ms+). These ﬁnd-
ings suggest that sympathetic nervous system arousal following the
negative faces was ampliﬁed in the presence of inherently incongruent
stimuli, relative to the presence of other expectancy-violating stimuli
(e.g., merely novel). Indeed, contrasting the Thatcherized vs. angry
and upside-down vs. angry comparisons, we ﬁnd an interaction,
whereas there is no such increase in sympathetic nervous system
PD (1500 + ms) for negative faces in the presence of novel faces (F(1,
75) = 4.89, p = 0.03, η2p = 0.061; angry: M = 0.11, SD = 0.09 vs.
upside-down: M = 0.11, SD = 0.09; angry: M = 0.14, SD = 0.07 vs.
Thatcherized:M= 0.11, SD= 0.09).
These ﬁndings converge with prior research showing that the pres-
ence of incongruity both enhances and prolongs the sympathetic ner-
vous system response to emotional stimuli (e.g., Dickerson & Kemeny,
2004; Grupe & Nitschke, 2011). More generally, it may be the case
that the presence of highly expectancy-violating stimuli generally
heightens arousal in response to all non-expectancy-violating stimuli,
whether it is emotionally valenced or even neutral. Future studies can
explore this hypothesis directly.
14.2. Expectancy bias vs. negativity bias
Prior research has shown evidence for a negativity bias, whereby
humans respond earlier to negative than to positive or neutral stimuli
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001; Cacioppo et al., 1999; Carretie et al.,
2001). Over the course of six experimental comparisons, we offer initial
support for the notion that humans maintain an even stronger expec-
tancy bias, insofar as different examples of expectancy-violating stimuli
captured a fundamental marker of attentional arousal—pupillary
dilation—earlier than threatening versions of the same stimuli. While
previous research has demonstrated that animals (e.g., Pearce & Hall,
1980) and humans (e.g., Dunchan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Hogarth,
Dickinson, & Duka, 2010) are motivated to attend to unexpected rela-
tive to expected information, no research, to our knowledge, has direct-
ly compared attentional bias to un-valanced expectancy-violating
stimuli relative to negatively and neutrally valanced unambiguous ver-
sions of the same stimuli. Moreover, our direct comparisons distinguish
the differential impact of the degree to which stimuli are expectancy-
violating, insofar as the most expectancy-violating stimuli evokes the
greatest PD markers of attentional bias.
14.3. Limitations and future directions
14.3.1. Additional markers of attention
While our studies support an attentional bias towards expectancy-
violating stimuli, they are limited by the use a speciﬁcmeasure of atten-
tional arousal—pupillary dilation—which does not represent a complete
and transparent window into the totality of attentional processing. This
limitation is shared by other measures of attention and arousal to vary-
ing degrees (e.g., assessedwith EEG, heightened N2 ERN is generally as-
sociated with incongruent stimuli (e.g., Stroop inconsistencies; Liotti
et al., 2000), but may also result from positively valenced stimuli
(e.g., pleasant images; Carretie, Hinojosa, Martin-Loeches, Mercado, &
Tapia, 2004).
In the case of our six experiments, the consistent spike in PD recorded
following both examples of expectancy-violating stimuli (Thatcherized
and upside-down faces) is consistent with the same spike following
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tencies, Laeng et al., 2011), which evoke markers consistent with
expectancy-violation using other measures (i.e., Stroop inconsistencies
[Liotti et al., 2000] and mismatch paradigms [Folstein & van Petten,
2008] both evoke N2 ERPs with EEG). As well, the subsequent rise in PD
recorded following the threatening stimuli (angry faces) is consistent
with the same subsequent rise following other examples of threatening
stimuli (i.e., threatening images, Bradley et al., 2008), which evoke subse-
quent markers consistent with threatening and otherwise emotionally
negative stimuli using other measures (i.e., angry faces [Schupp et al.,
2004] and unpleasant images [Hajcak, Dunning, & Foti, 2009] both
evoke Late Positive Potential ERPs with EEG).
Subsequent research using simultaneous eye tracking and EEG can
determine whether pupillary markers of inconsistency (spike in PD)
that begin to peak 500 ms after stimulus onset are reliably preceded
by markers of inconsistency (e.g., N2) that arrive 200 ms after stimulus
onset. Furthermore, it can be determined whether pupillary markers of
valenced emotional salience (gradually heightened PD) that peak
1500 ms after stimulus onset are reliably preceded by ERP markers of
emotional regulation (e.g., Late Positive Potential) that arrive as late as
1000 ms after stimulus onset (Hajcak et al., 2009). If, indeed, markers
of inconsistency and emotional salience assessed as PD were associated
with corresponding markers assessed as ERPs—along the same sequen-
tial time course—this would provide robust convergent evidence for a
general expectancy bias.
14.3.2. Additional sources of expectancy violation and emotional valence
These experiments operationalized threat in terms of a single class of
salient social stimuli: human faces. Future research should assess the ex-
tent to which expectancy-violating and threatening examples of non-
social stimuli (e.g., snakes) also produce effects consistent with an ex-
pectancy bias. Examining the extent of this bias should also involve com-
paring expectancy-violating and emotionally valenced versions of other
negative stimuli, for example, sources of disgust. As well, the extent of
any expectancy bias can be further assessed in terms of expectancy-
violating and emotionally valenced version of non-negative stimuli:
equally salient positive images. Finally, several current theorists propose
an array of behaviors that should follow from the experience of
expectancy-violation (e.g., Jonas et al., 2014; Proulx, 2012), and it re-
mains to be seen whether these compensation behaviors uniquely fol-
low from expectancy-violating (vs. threatening) experiences.
15. Conclusion
Whereas prior theorists have proposed an overriding negativity bias
in human attention, the present study provides initial evidence for a su-
perseding expectancy bias in pupillary arousal for social stimuli. Such a
bias would have important implications for why—and how—people
seek to regulate their emotions and guide their actions, insofar as
thoughts, beliefs and behaviors may be proximally motivated by the re-
duction of feelings of uncertainty relative to potential threat. However,
further researchusing awider range of stimuli and attentionalmeasures
is required to specify the nature of any general expectancy bias, as well
as to explore the diversity of its manifestation. In sum, though bad may
be stronger than good, the eyes have it that incongruity may be stron-
gest of all.
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